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Abstract
This Article focuses on some of AG Jacobs’ opinions regarding matters of competition, start-
ing with his contributions on the meaning of “undertaking” in Ho¨fner and AOK, under a com-
bination of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”) Articles 82 and 86
(special and exclusive rights), and Risparmio, under Articles 86 and 87 (State aids). It does not
deal with many other opinions he wrote on the meaning of “undertaking,” such as those in Albany
and Pavlov. Finally, it discusses his opinions on refusals to deal in Bronner and Syfait, along with
a selection of other judgments on the topic.
ADVOCATE GENERAL JACOBS'
CONTRIBUTION TO COMPETITION LAW
Valentine Korah*
INTRODUCTION
Francis Jacobs has made many outstanding contributions to
European Community law as referendaire, barrister, Professor of
European Law at King's College London, and, most recently and
importantly, as Advocate General ("AG") at the European Court
ofJustice ("ECJ"). His opinions have been lucid and tightly writ-
ten. He has shown a desirable way forward in many areas where
the law was undeveloped, confused, or clearly wrong on grounds
of European Community ("Community") policy. Invariably, he
has provided cogent, theoretical underpinnings for his views,
often starting from first principles and spelling out reasons of
policy. Occasionally, he has referred to foreign law. Sometimes,
the ECJ has followed his opinions, as in Hdfner,1 but not in AOK,2
on the meaning of "undertaking," or in Bronner,3 on a dominant
firm's refusal to supply. In Syfait,4 the ECJ refused jurisdiction,
leaving the opinion with some authority on substance and sound
theoretical arguments on policy related to basic Community
principles. In Jgo-Qu6rg5 and other cases, the ECJ endorsed his
views on policy, but left reform to the legislature. That accords
with the civil law tradition that courts should not usurp legisla-
tive power. Nevertheless, the Community courts have done
much to advance Community policy and I welcome AG Jacobs'
* Professor Emeritus of Competition Law at University College London, formerly,
Visiting Professor at Fordham Law School for fourteen spring semesters. I am grateful
to my colleague at University College London, loannis Lianos, for reading a draft of
this paper and for making many helpful comments. Naturally, I remain responsible for
errors; he has not even seen the final version.
1. H6fner v. Macrotron GmbH, Case C-41/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1979, [1993] 4
C.M.L.R. 306.
2. AOK Bundesverband v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, Hermani & Co., Joined
Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 & G-355/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-2493, [2004] 4
C.M.L.R_ 1261.
3. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Seitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag
GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112.
4. See Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) v. GlaxoS-
mithKline plc, Case G-53/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-4609, [2005] 5 C.M.L.R. 7.
5. See Commission v.J~go-Qu&r6 & Cie SA, Case C-263/02 P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-3425,
[2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 266.
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contribution to developing Community law sensibly and by refer-
ence to principles.
I shall confine this Article to some of AG Jacobs' opinions
on matters of competition, starting with his contributions on the
meaning of "undertaking" in H6fner6 and AOK,7 under a combi-
nation of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty") Articles 82 and 86 (special and exclusive rights),8
and Risparmio,' under Articles 86 and 87 (State aids).lO I will not
deal with many other opinions he wrote on the meaning of "un-
dertaking," however, such as those in Albany11 and Pavlov.12 Fi-
nally, I shall discuss his opinions on refusals to deal in Bronner1 3
and Syfait,14 along with a selection of other judgments on the
topic.
I. THE MEANING OF "UNDERTAKING" UNDER
ARTICLE 86 (EX 90)
The EC Treaty is neutral as between public and private
property, and the public sector of several Member States is large.
So, it is hardly surprising that the fathers of the EC Treaty should
have wished to control anti-competitive State measures. On the
other hand, curbing State powers is a highly sensitive political
act. The EC Treaty left the extent to which public bodies were
subject to its provisions largely to the ECJ,15 which has been
6. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Hofner, Case C-41/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-
1979, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306.
7. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, AOK, Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/
01, C-354/01 & C-355/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-2493, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1261.
8. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
arts. 82, 86, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), at 65-66 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
9. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Ministero dell'Economia e delle
Finanze v. Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA, Case C-222/04 (ECJ Jan. 10, 2006) (not
yet reported).
10. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 86-87, O.J. C 325/33, at 66-67 (2002).
11. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Albany Int'l BV v. Stichting Bedrijf-
spensioenfonds Textielindustrie, Joined Cases C-67/96, C-115-17/97 & C-219/97,
[1999] E.C.R. 1-5751, [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 446.
12. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Pavlov v. Stichting Pensioenfonds
Medische Specialisten, Joined Cases C-180-84/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-6451, [2001] 4
C.M.L.R. 30.
13. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bronner, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. I-
7791, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112.
14. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Syfait, Case C-53/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-
4609, [2005] 5 C.M.L.R. 7.
15. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 86, 220, 295, O.J. C 325/33, at 66, 122, 148
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struggling under the tension of conflicting Community objec-
tives of policy. Measures to implement social and environmental
policies of the Community may be perceived as barriers to entry
and anticompetitive. Should one policy objective prevail over
the others or should each give way to the others only insofar as is
necessary and proportionate?
Article 86 (formerly 90) provides:
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to
which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Mem-
ber States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any mea-
sure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particu-
lar to those rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to
89.
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of
general economic interest or having the character of a reve-
nue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules con-
tained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competi-
tion, in so far as the application of such rules does not ob-
struct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular
tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not
be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the in-
terests of the Community.16
The prohibitions in Articles 82 and 86(1) in combination, as well
as the exception in Article 86(2), apply only to "undertakings," a
term that refers to an economic unit rather than a person. 7
When trying to reconcile the competition rules with other
Community policies, such as social or environmental measures,
there is a temptation, to which the judges in some later cases
have succumbed,18 to find that public bodies implementing
(2002). Throughout this Article, I shall use the numbering of the articles adopted by
the Treaty of Amsterdam, even when referring to a period before the Treaty took effect.
16. Id. art. 86(1)-(2).
17. Hydrotherm Geratebau GmbH v. Compact de Dott. Ing. Mario Andreoli &
C.S.A.S., Case 170/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2999, 3016, 11-12, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 224, 242.
18. See Diego Cali & Figli Srl v. Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA (SEPG),
Case C-343/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-1547, 1-1588-89, 23, [1997] 5 C.M.L.R. 484, 519 (find-
ing that an anti-pollution surveillance was a public interest and not an economic inter-
est that would fall under the rules of the Treaty); see also SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v.
European Org. for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol), Case C-364/92, [1994]
E.C.R. 1-43, 1-63-64, 30, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 208, 225 (finding that a service controlling
airline traffic was not a service of economic character); Poucet v. Assurances Generales
de France (AGF),Joined Cases C-159/91 & C-160/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-637, 1-670, 18-
19 (finding that organizations involved in the management of a public social security
system fulfill an exclusively social function).
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other Community policies are not undertakings. Then, the so-
cial or environmental policy prevails over competition policy,
whether or not it was necessary for competition law to give way
altogether. There is no limitation of measures implementing
the other policies to those that are necessary and proportionate.
If, however, a body subject to public law is held to be an under-
taking, Article 86(2) allows a derogation from competition pol-
icy to the extent that is necessary and proportionate. 9 The
question concerning whether a body constitutes an undertaking
is, therefore, very important.
A. H6fner
In H6fner, two private firms that had provided headhunting
services sued for their contractual fees. The defendant claimed
that the contract in the private sector was illegal and void be-
cause, under German law, only the State-owned labor office may
legally provide such services. Because the labor exchange was
unable to fill more than twenty-eight percent of the demand for
executives, however, it encouraged private firms to infringe the
German rules and do so. 20 Consequently, the labor office com-
peted with them,21 but made no charges for its services. 22
Under Article 234, the Higher Regional Court in Munich
asked the ECJ whether the rules of the EC Treaty, on the free
movement of services and competition, applied to the labor of-
fice.23
AG Jacobs found that Article 59 (on the free movement of
services) 24 did not apply and dwelt longer on Articles 82 and
86.25 He had no difficulty in accepting the plaintiffs' argument
19. Ferring SA v. Agence Centrale des Organismes de Securite Sociale, Case C-53/
00, [2001] E.C.R. 1-9067, 9111, 31, [2003] 1 C.M.L.R. 1001, 1036.
20. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Hofner, Case C-41/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-
1979, 1-1997, 13, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306, 317.
21. Advocate General Poiares Maduro has subsequently made this point in FENIN.
Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Federaci6n Espafiola de Empresas de
Tecnologfa Sanitaria (FENIN), Case C-205/03 P, 28 (ECJ Nov. 10, 2005) (not yet
reported).
22. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Hofner, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-1996-97,
10, 13, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 316-17.
23. See H6fner, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-2014, 12, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 331-32.
24. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 59, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 58.
25. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Hdfner, [19911 E.C.R. at 1-2002, 1-
2003-08, 1 30, 32-53, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 322-29.
2006] 719
720 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:716
that the labor office was a public undertaking within the mean-
ing of Articles 82 and 86(1) and "an undertaking entrusted with
the operation of services of general economic interest" within
the meaning of Article 86(2).26 He added that, with a statutory
monopoly, the office was clearly dominant over the market for
employment procurement services throughout Germany.27
He rejected the view that a Member State conferring a
greater monopoly than was required in the public interest con-
stituted the abuse of a dominant position. 28 Article 295 (for-
merly 222) clearly states that Member States may decide how far
to nationalize or privatize particular sectors of the economy.29
Although the labor office had encouraged headhunters to
compete with it, the combined effect of the legislation confer-
ring the exclusive right and the failure of the office to meet de-
mand resulted in consumers being unable to obtain services they
would expect in conditions of free competition. An employer
seeking an executive would be in the same position as the owner
of a Volvo car unable to obtain a replacement front-wing
panel.3 0  "Abuse" has been held in many judgments3 1 to be an
objective concept, not depending on intent. AGJacobs consid-
ered that the failure to supply might affect trade among Member
States and would amount to the abuse of its dominant position.32
Consequently, the exclusive rights would be ineffective unless
26. See id. at 1-2004, 40, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 324.
27. See id. at 1-2004, 41, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 324-25. The statement that the
holder of a statutory exclusive right enjoys a dominant position has been repeated
many times since, but does not apply to intellectual property rights, for which there may
be substitutes. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R.
487, 500, 13, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631, 657-58. States are unlikely to grant special or
exclusive rights directly unless they confer considerable market power. The situation of
the labor office, which supplied only twenty-eight percent of headhunting services, was
anomolous. Without a statutory monopoly, such a market share would not have suf-
ficed for a finding that the office was dominant. The fact that it was able to meet such a
small proportion of the demand resulted in it having to compete with private firms.
There was a market for head hunting services to find executives.
28. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Hifner, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-2005, 43,
[1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 325.
29. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 295, OJ. C 325/33, at 148 (2002).
30. See AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989]
4 C.M.L.R. 122 (concerning when refusals to deal or license might amount to the abuse
of a dominant position).
31. This definition originated with Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, Case
85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461, 520, 38.
32. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, H6fner, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-2006, 1 46,
[1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 326.
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the derogation of Article 86(2) applied.33 That was a factual is-
sue for the referring court.34
The judgment followed the opinion of AG Jacobs. The
judgment specifically addressed the issue of what constitutes an
undertaking without giving reasons:
It must be observed, in the context of competition law, first
that the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity
engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status
of the entity and the way in which it is financed and, secondly,
that employment procurement is an economic activity.35
It is the nature of the activity that must be economic,
whether or not it is paid for commercially3 6 This idea has been
repeated in many subsequent judgments of the ECJ.3 7
The ECJ confirmed that the derogation in Article 86(2)
might still apply." Everyone, including the employment office,
agreed that the latter was unable to meet demand. 39 Conse-
quently, social policy did not require a breach of the competi-
tion rules. In holding that the employment office might consti-
tute an undertaking, the ECJ and AG Jacobs ensured that the
competition rules would be ineffective only to the extent that
the entity entrusted with the operation of services of general eco-
nomic interest could not perform its task without infringing the
competition rules.4 °
B. AOK
One case where AGJacobs and the ECJ differed was AOK.4 1
German law required most employees to belong to the State in-
surance system. The system was funded by compulsory contribu-
tions from employees and employers and based partly on social
33. See id. at 1-2006-07, 47, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 327-28.
34. See id. at 1-1994, 1 1, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 314.
35. HOfner, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1979, 1-2016, 21, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306, 333.
36. See id. at 1-2016-17, 11 22-23, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 333.
37. See, e.g., Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA v. Commission, Case 395/
96, [2000] E.C.R. 1-1365, [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 1076.
38. See Hdfner, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-2017, 27, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 334.
39. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Hofner, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-1997-98,
14(i), [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 317.
40. See id. at 1-2003, 36, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 323-24; see also H6fner, [1991] E.C.R.
at 1-2020, 28, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 334.
41. AOKJoined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 & C-355/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-
2493, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1261.
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solidarity, the healthy subsidizing the sick or disabled. Sickness
funds provided the care itself, not just insurance. Most sickness
funds were governed by public law. The funds were organized
by region and sector through associations.
The various sickness funds in Germany entered into a buy-
ing cartel. Under statutory powers, their association decided
which medical products would have fixed maximum payments
and the amount they would reimburse for these products. To
the extent that the maximum was exceeded, the patient had to
pay. The scheme had been amended after the main proceed-
ings were commenced to permit the funds some discretion when
setting the amounts and the funds competed in attracting mem-
bers. Questions arose regarding whether the funds were under-
takings subject to the competition rules, whether decisions of
their leading associations were capable of infringing Article 81,
and, if so, whether the derogation of Article 86(2) might apply.
AG Jacobs first considered whether the sickness funds were
undertakings.42 The test is functional in that it depends on the
type of activity rather than on the characteristic of the actors
which perform it. It was irrelevant that the funds were subject to
public law or were part of the State administration. Nor did the
social or general interest objectives prevent the funds from be-
ing undertakings.
In assessing whether an activity is economic in character, the
basic test appears to me to be whether it could, at least in
principle, be carried on by a private undertaking in order to
make profits. If there were no possibility of a private under-
taking carrying on a given activity, there would be no purpose
in applying the competition rules to it.43
Next, AG Jacobs considered the somewhat inconsistent
judgments of the ECJ in the field of social policy versus competi-
tion.44 The ECJ had occasionally held that, where there was a
large element of solidarity in sickness insurance, as in Poucet and
Pistre,45 the entity was not an undertaking. AG Jacobs distin-
guished such schemes from those with a capital fund into which
42. See id. at 1272-76, 1 25-46.
43. Id. at 1272, 27.
44. See id. at 1272-76, 1 2546.
45. Poucet v. Assurances Generales de France (AGF), Joined Cases G159/91 & C-
160/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-637, 1-670, 1 18-20.
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contributions are paid and under which benefits are related to
contributions, which, at least in principle, are subject to the com-
petition rules, despite some element of solidarity.46 Classifica-
tion is a matter of degree.47
AG Jacobs distinguished earlier cases where the sickness
funds in AOK enjoyed some autonomy, even though it was lim-
ited. The funds did actually compete with each other both for
those required to insure under the statutory scheme and for
those not so required.48 AG Jacobs concluded that, in agreeing
on the fixed amounts, the funds were acting within the sphere of
their economic activity. 49 He also accepted the appellants' argu-
ment that if the funds were "undertakings," then their individual
associations were acting as associations of undertakings when set-
ting the fixed amounts.50
In AGJacobs's view, Article 86(1) in combination with Arti-
cle 81 was applicable.5" It was for the national court to decide
whether the act of State defense applied. 2 Citing several judg-
ments, he accepted, however, that the derogation in Article
86(2) applied.53 The method for setting the fixed amounts was
not disproportionate. Community law accords Member States
discretion in organizing a social security system and the German
system was less invasive than some others.
On this view, governments can provide a service entirely
with State resources, which are not subject to the competition
rules; they can privatize an activity that will remain subject to
them. If governments take an intermediate position and let a
State entity compete with private firms, the entity has an oppor-
tunity to justify its conduct under Article 86(2).
The ECJ, however, decided that the funds were not under-
takings because they were exercising a social function.54 Conse-
quently, Article 86(1) did not apply and there was no need to
46. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, AOK, [2004] E.C.R. 1-2493, 34,
[2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1261, 1273-74.
47. See id. at 1274, 35.
48. See id. at 1275, 1 37-42.
49. See id. at 1275-76, 77 43-46.
50. See id. at 1276-79, 77 47-56.
51. See id. at 1280-81, 7 67-72.
52. See id. at 1281-84, 7 73-85.
53. See id. at 1284-87, 7 86-102.
54. See AOK, Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, G-354/01 & C-355/01, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-2493, 11 45-66, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1261, 1297-1300.
2006]
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consider whether the interference with competition was propor-
tionate to the social need.55 To the parties, the difference be-
tween AG Jacobs and the ECJ may not matter. I regret that the
ECJ held that the funds were not undertakings, however, as in
later cases and in relation to different kinds of social policy or
environmental protection, competition law will be ousted,
whether or not the measures are proportionate.
C. FENIN
We still await the judgment of the ECJ in FENIN. 6 In this
case, the public bodies responsible for the provision of health
care under the Spanish national health system bought medical
instruments to enable it to provide the care free of charge. 7
Was their conduct subject to the competition rules?
AG Poiares Maduro started by applying the functional test-
adopted since AGJacobs' opinion in Hofner-irrespective of the
way the entity is financed.58 This test is harder to apply, how-
ever, where there is no competitive market to compare-almost
any activity is capable of being carried out by a profit making
undertaking. 9 He went on to suggest that the labor office was
held to be an undertaking in Hdfner, because it was competing
with the private sector.6 °
AG Poiares Maduro distinguished various cases where the
competition rules did not apply to non-economic activities, be-
cause they were part of the essential function of the State and
suggested that, although provision of health care was somewhat
more competitive than the control of navigation involved in in
Eurocontro 1 and the environmental control in an Italian harbor
55. See id. at 1300, 66.
56. Federaci6n Espafiola de Empresas de Tecnologfa Sanitaria (FENIN), Case C-
205/03 P (ECJ) (not yet reported). The other major question was whether buying the
goods needed to perform a service downstream could be treated as an economic activ-
ity, either together with the sale of the service or independently. I will not consider the
question. We await the judgment of the ECJ, but in November 2005, AG Poiares Ma-
duro delivered his opinion. See Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, FENIN,
Case C-205/03 P (ECJ Nov. 10, 2005) (not yet reported).
57. Federaci6n Nacional de Empresas, Instrumentaci6n Cientifica, M~dica,
T~cnica y Dental (FENIN) v. Commission, Case T-319/99, [2003] E.C.R. 11-357, 11-361-
62, 1 1-2.
58. Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, FENIN, 11.
59. Id. 12.
60. Id. 13, 28.
61. Eurocontrol, Case C-364/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-43, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 208.
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in Diego Cali &Figli, 62 health care might be treated as a function
of State where solidarity predominated. He recommended that
the extent of solidarity excluding the competition rules could be
assessed as follows:
(a) an obligation of universal service implies solidarity in so far
as cost differentials are ignored, but not sufficiently, in itself, to
prevent the service being economic; (b) a higher level of solidar-
ity is achieved when the relevant service is supplied free of
charge; (c) if public and private entities provide the same ser-
vices, any analysis will have to be undertaken under Article
86(2)-in other words, the public entity must be an undertaking
if in competition with private firms; and (d) where the services
can be delivered only by bodies controlled by the State, which
must supply anyone free of charge, there can be no question of
market forces being involved-in other words, the entity does
not amount to an undertaking. 63
AG Poiares Maduro's attitude to the first two situations does
not contradict AG Jacobs's position,6 4 but provides more detail.
The third situation goes further and states that, where the State
and private individual provide the same service, the State entity
must be an "undertaking,"65 which also goes further than AG
Jacobs. AG Poiares Maduro says, "free of charge." 66 Payment
was not relevant in Hofner.67 Thus, the statement may envisage
State functions similar to those in Eurocontrol.68
AG Poiares Maduro concluded, however, that it would be
more fruitful to consider the application of the competition
rules through the application of Article 86(2) than through a
formal definition of the concept of "undertaking."69 This clearly
follows the attitude of AGJacobs.
62. Diego Cali & Figli Sri v. Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA (SEPG), Case C-
343/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-1547, [1997] 5 C.M.L.R. 484.
63. See Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, FENIN, 31.
64. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, AOK, Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/
01, C-354/01 & C-355/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-2493, 1 35, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1261, 1274
(stating that solidarity was a matter of degree).
65. Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, FENIN, 31.
66. Id.
67. See generally H6fner, Case C-41/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1979, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306.
68. Eurocontrol, Case C-364/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-43, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 208.
69. Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, JTENIN, Case C-205/03 P, 1 47.
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D. Risparmio
In Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze v. Cassa di Risparmio
di Firenze SpA, the ECJ, following AG Jacobs, extended the con-
cept of undertaking to cover an entity "not only when it offers
goods and services on the market but also when it carries out
other activities which are economic in nature and which could
lead to distortions in a market where competition exists."7 °
The ECJ held that an entity that holds controlling share-
holdings in companies engaged in banking and that, by use of its
authority, directly participates in administering those compa-
nies, must be regarded as an undertaking engaged in an eco-
nomic activity for the purposes of Article 87(1) (State aid).7'
Thus, the EC rules on State aid applied. AG Jacobs referred to
case law relating to the Sixth VAT directive 72 and, in my view, the
judgment applies to Articles 82 combined with 86, as well as to
Article 87.
Both AG Jacobs and the ECJ were concerned that the rules
on State aid might otherwise be avoided by splitting an entity-
one part operating on a market and the other, which received
the aid, controlling the first entity.7 3 Both concluded that,
where a banking foundation actually exercised control over sub-
sidiaries that traded on a market, the foundations were subject
to the competition rules unless they qualified under Article
86(2).71 I am delighted that the ECJ spelled out reasons of pol-
icy for its conclusions and did not merely apply rules formalisti-
cally. It makes it easier for us to understand where the law may
be going and may influence the direction.
The ECJ has not yet been called upon to decide whether an
undertaking not "entrusted with the operation of services of gen-
eral economic interest" is an undertaking subject to Article
70. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Risparmio, Case C-222/04, 78 (ECJ Oct.
27, 2005) (not yet reported).
71. Id. It 87-93.
72. Id. 1 88. AG Jacobs said that:
[F]or the sake of coherence and uniformity, the same concepts in different
areas of Community law should, as a general rule, be given identical meaning,
unless otherwise justified by the nature or specific features of the area in
which that concept is being inserted and which may warrant an ad hoc read-
ing.
Id. 1 88 n.26.
73. Id. 1 84.
74. Id. 1 134.
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86(1). In such a case, holding that it is an undertaking would
leave no obvious way to exclude the competition rules even to
the extent necessary to enable other Community policies to ap-
ply. That problem did not arise in Risparmio and it is difficult to
envisage such a case.
E. Conclusion on the Meaning of "Undertaking"
AG Jacobs's opinion in H'fner has been very influential. He
started by defining "undertaking" in terms of "being engaged in
an economic activity." In later cases involving public health in-
surance or care, the ECJ was unwilling to apply competition pol-
icy to trump provisions for health care and started to look to the
criterion of solidarity to protect rules of social security from it.
In AOK, Mr. Jacobs tried, without immediate success, to preserve
the application of the competition rules, to the extent that they
were not inconsistent with other Community polices, through
the use of Article 86(2). We await the judgment of the ECJ in
FENIN. Followed by the ECJ in Risparmio, AG Jacobs extended
the case-law under Article 86(2) to State aid and to situations
where statutory power controls over an affiliate were actually ex-
ercised to control the activities of the affiliate. AG Jacobs has
given his views in most of the cases defining the concept of "un-
dertaking."
II. REFUSALS TO SUPPLY
AG Jacobs has been extremely influential also in limiting
the obligation of a dominant firm to supply anyone who wants
access to an essential facility.75 Where some firms are supplied
on more advantageous terms than others, the abuse within the
meaning of Article 82 may consist of discrimination contrary to
Article 82(c) and, thus, there is no need to establish harm to
consumers, but there are other limitations.7 6 This Article, how-
75. Although this Article will not consider all the importantjudgments in this area,
there are far fuller analyses citing more authority. See, e.g., John Temple Lang, The
Application of the Essential Facility Doctrine to Intellectual Property Rights Under European Com-
petition Law, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 56-84
(Francois Leveque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005); Thomas Eilmansberger, The Essen-
tial Facilities Doctrine Under Art. 82: What is the State of Affairs After IMS Health and
Microsoft?, 16 KC.L.R. 329 (2005); VALENTINE KoRAH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (2006).
76. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 82(c), O.J. C 325/33, at 65 (2002) ("applying
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ever, only discusses the application of Article 82(b) , 7 7 infringe-
ment of which requires harm to consumers and is more in line
with the European Commission's ("Commission") current con-
cern to protect consumers rather than competitors.
AG Jacobs has stressed the need for an incentive for the in-
cumbent to invest in the original facility, an incentive for the
newcomer to reproduce it where this is possible, and detailed
regulation when setting the compensation for granting compul-
sory access. He has insisted that, for the newcomer to be enti-
tled to access, the incumbent must have a stranglehold down-
stream.
A. Commercial Solvents and the Early Decisions of the Commission
The obligation of a dominant firm to supply a former cus-
tomer with products he needs to carry on business in a neighbor-
ing market stems from the early 1970s. In Commercial Solvents,
78
the ECJ held that it was contrary to Article 82 for a dominant
firm to refuse to supply a former customer of raw materials and,
thereby, eliminate its competition downstream.79 Commercial
Solvents was the only firm in the world that could make ami-
nobutanol on a commercial sale.80 When its half-owned joint
venture started to use aminobutanol to produce a cure for tuber-
culosis, called ethambutol, Commercial Solvents refused to sup-
ply Zoja, its competitor downstream and former customer,8" with
the raw materials.8"
The ECJ confirmed the Commission's decision to require
supply but did not distinguish between free and fair competi-
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading partners, thereby
putting them at a competitive disadvantage").
77. Id. art. 82(b), at 65 ("[L]imiting production, markets or technical develop-
ment to the prejudice of consumers.").
78. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Com-
missionJoined Cases 6/73 & 7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309 [herein-
after Commercial Solvents].
79. Id. at 250-51, 25, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. at 340-41.
80. Id. at 247, 9, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. at 337. Its patents had expired, but it bene-
fited from secret expertise. These days, expertise is being treated more like an intellec-
tual property right. So it may be wrong to treat this case as relating to a refusal to
supply goods and not to a refusal to license an intellectual property right.
81. Zoja had asked for the contract of supply to be terminated. Id. at 250, 23,
[1974] 1 C.M.L.R. at 340. When aminobutanol ceased to be available cheaply on the
market, Zoja wanted the contract revived. Id.
82. Id.
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tion,83 although one of the judges, Pierre Pescatore, has stated
in public that the ECJ had to come to the help of a small pro-
ducer, Zoja. Currently, the Commission states that it is protect-
ing competition rather than competitors.84 Thus, justification
for not supplying a competitor should not be required when
consumers are not harmed.85
The ECJ confirmed a duty to supply goods and services in
several other cases, such as United Brands8 6 and T9l6marketing.8 v
In a series of decisions in the early 1990s, the Commission re-
quired that the operators of sea and airports grant access to ferry
operators that competed with the port operator's ferries. Some
of the markets were very narrow-just a single port and the
routes it served. Competition practitioners became very worried
about the reduction of the original incentive to develop a facil-
ity.
B. Magill
In Magill, the Commission and courts limited the right to
withhold supply to a competitor downstream.88 Each of the
three television stations franchised to transmit programs that
could be received in Ireland and Northern Ireland (separate
Member States) published its own weekly guide of programs in
advance.89 When Magill started to publish a comprehensive
weekly guide to the three stations, each sued it successfully for
copyright infringement.9" The Commission, however, adopted a
decision stating that this amounted to abuse of the stations'
83. Id. at 256, 11 46-47, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. at 345.
84. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG COMPETITION DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE APPLI-
CATION OF ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES 17 (Dec. 2005), available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf; see
also Commission Notice, 13, O.J. C 101/97, at 98 (2004) (Guidelines on the applica-
tion of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty).
85. Also remember that Article 82(b) is infringed only if there is harm to consum-
ers. See id.
86. United Brands Co. & United Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission, Case 27/
76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429.
87. Centre Belge d'Etudes du March&T6lmarketing SA (CBEM) v. Compagnie
Luxembourgeoise de T616diffusion, Case 311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261, [1986] 2
C.M.L.R. 558.
88. See Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Commission, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R.
11-485 and Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743 [hereinafter
Magill].
89. See id. at 1-811-12, 7, 9.
90. See id. at 1-812, 1 10.
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dominant positions and required each to supply Magill with the
information needed to publish the weekly guide.91 The Court of
First Instance ("CFI") and the ECJ confirmed because of the spe-
cial circumstances of the case.9 2
Although the ECJ had confirmed several earlier rulings that
held that mere ownership of an intellectual property right does
not confer a dominant position,93 it found that the stations each
enjoyed a dominant position over that information because they
were the only source of program information for a company
publishing a comprehensive guide to television programs. The
ECJ also confirmed that "the exercise of an exclusive right by the
proprietor may, in exceptional circumstances, involve abusive
conduct."94
The ECJ found that the exercise of copyright against Magill
was abusive.95 There were no substitutes for the information.96
The CFI had found that the weekly highlights and daily pro-
grams in the newspapers or the individual weekly guides pub-
lished by the stations were not sufficient and that the ECJ had no
jurisdiction on questions of fact.
The producer of a comprehensive weekly guide was depen-
dent on the stations:
The appellants' refusal to provide basic information by rely-
ing on national copyright provisions thus prevented the ap-
pearance of a new product, a comprehensive weekly guide to
television programmes, which the appellants did not offer
and for which there was a potential consumer demand. Such
refusal constitutes an abuse under heading (b) of the second
paragraph of Article [82] of the [Consolidated EC] Treaty.9 7
The refusal was not justified and enabled the stations to reserve
the market for weekly television guides for themselves.98 In the
light of all these circumstances, the ECJ held that the CFI had
not erred in law.99
91. See id. at 1-812, 12.
92. See id. at 1-836, 77 100-01.
93. See id. at 1-822, 46.
94. See id. at 1-823, 7 50.
95. See id. at 1-825, 57.
96. See id. at 1-823, 52.
97. Id. at 1-824, 1 54.
98. See id. at 1-824, 77 55-56.
99. See id. at 1-836, 101.
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Magill was only the second case in which the ECJ confirmed
a duty to license intellectual property rights, the other was AB
Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd."° In Magill, the Court stated that the
duty arises only in exceptional circumstances. 10 Thus, some
people have inferred that it is harder to establish a duty to li-
cense intellectual property rights than to supply goods or ser-
vices.' 0 2
How far the judgment went was controversial. What was ex-
ceptional? If the stations had been treated as dominant based
on their franchises to transmit, the ECJ could have avoided the
difficult questions relating to intellectual property rights0 . and
whether the abuse was a refusal to license or to supply informa-
tion.10 4
Were the three conditions of paragraph 54 cumulative, as
indicated by the conjunction, "and," or alternative? 1 5 Were they
exhaustive or were there other special circumstances? Clearly,
the exclusion of a new kind of product is more serious than the
exclusion of a firm that will supply virtually the same product,
but I would be sorry if novelty was a condition of access. It is an
imprecise concept and, in AB Volvo,1°6 the ECJ had confirmed,
in principle, that the refusal to grant a copyright license to man-
ufacture or import spare parts for Volvo cars on reasonable
terms was not abusive,' 07 but suggested three circumstances in
which it might be. 1 Novelty is not always desirable. In Volvo,
the desired spare parts would have been useless if they did not fit
the car. John Temple Lang suggests that novelty applies only to
a new type of product. 9 It seems to me that this test is stricter
100. AB Volvo, Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 122.
101. See Magill, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743, 1-823, 1 50.
102. See, e.g., Eilmansberger, supra note 75, at 332-34; Temple Lang, supra note 75,
at 64-65.
103. It is not clear that there was an infringement of copyright, although the CFI
had held that there was. See Magill, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-485, 11-529, 98.
104. As Sir Jeremy Lever said at the Fordham International Intellectual Property
Conference in 2005, the stations must have had licenses to transmit, so probably were
dominant, but the Court relied on their being the only source of the information about
program times a week ahead. See Sir Jeremy Lever, Address at the Fordham Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Conference (Apr. 1, 2005).
105. See Magill, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743, 1-824, 1 54.
106. AB Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 122.
107. See id. at 6236, 11, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 136.
108. See id. at 6235, 1 9, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 135-36.
109. Temple Lang, supra note 75, at 61, 65.
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than some, but no more precise.
As AG Jacobs observed in Bronner, few Member States grant
copyright in information." 0 Such a copyright gives too broad an
exclusive right.11' The stations needed consumers to be aware of
their programs and did not need any copyright protection to in-
duce them to publish their own guides.' 12 The United Kingdom
law of copyright was changed in 1988 to require a statutory li-
cense.
C. Oscar Bronner
The law went far in requiring a dominant firm to supply a
competitor downstream, but the opinion of AG Jacobs in Bron-
ner 3 stemmed the tide considerably. A newspaper proprietor
required access to the only national home delivery service in
Austria." 4 Media Print's delivery service was not protected by
any intellectual property right. 15 Both the judgment and opin-
ion were important and were cited by the ECJ in IMS,"1 6 by AG
Jacobs in Syfait, and by the Commission in Microsoft.1 1 7 They
have been influential. In Bronner, after describing the way that
American courts had drawn back from applying their essential
facilities doctrine, AG Jacobs made several important general
points:
56. First, it is apparent that the right to choose one's trading
partners and freely to dispose of one's property are generally
recognised principles in the laws of the Member States, in
110. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bronner, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R.
1-7794, 1-7812, 62, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 133.
111. Originally, the data protection directive gave no exclusive right to informa-
tion, but there was a dispute in Parliament and the actual text does protect it. See gener-
ally European Parliament and Council Directive No. 96/9/EC, O.J. L 77/20 (1996).
112. See Panel Discussion of Magll, in 2 INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAw AND POLICY 36-1, 36-3 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1998) (commenting on Ian S. For-
rester, Magill, "A Famous Victory"? Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights,
in id. at 35-1); see also Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bronner, [1998] E.C.R. at I-
7812, 63, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 133.
113. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bronner, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. I-
7794, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112.
114. See Bronner, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7794, 1-7820-21, 4-9, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112,
137-38.
115. See id.
116. See IMS Health GmbH & Co. KG v. NDC Health, Case C-418/01, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-5039, 27-28, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 28, 1556.
117. Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Microsoft), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf.
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some cases with constitutional status. Incursions on those
rights require careful justification.
57. Secondly, the justification in terms of competition policy
for interfering with a dominant undertaking's freedom to
contract often requires a careful balancing of conflicting con-
siderations. In the long term it is generally pro-competitive
and in the interest of consumers to allow a company to retain
for its own use facilities which it has developed for the pur-
pose of its business. For example, if access to a production,
purchasing or distribution facility were allowed too easily
there would be no incentive for a competitor to develop com-
peting facilities. Thus while competition was increased in the
short term it would be reduced in the long term. Moreover,
the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in effi-
cient facilities would be reduced if its competitors were, upon
request, able to share the benefits. Thus the mere fact that by
retaining a facility for its own use a dominant undertaking
retains an advantage over a competitor cannot justify requir-
ing access to it.
58. Thirdly, in assessing this issue it is important not to lose
sight of the fact that the primary purpose of Article [82] is to
prevent distortion of competition - and in particular to safe-
guard the interests of consumers-rather than to protect the
position of particular competitors. It may therefore, for ex-
ample, be unsatisfactory, in a case in which a competitor de-
mands access to a raw material in order to be able to compete
with the dominant undertaking on a downstream market in a
final product, to focus solely on the latter's market power on
the upstream market and conclude that its conduct in reserv-
ing to itself the downstream market is automatically an abuse.
Such conduct will not have an adverse impact on consumers
unless the dominant undertaking's final product is suffi-
ciently insulated from competition to give it market power.
11 8
After analyzing the Community case law, AG Jacobs added
that a duty to supply was justified only when there was "a genu-
ine stranglehold on the related market." '119 The cost of duplica-
tion could be enough to make access indispensable, especially if
the original investment had been made under non-competitive
conditions, for instance, partly through public funding.
118. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bronner, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. I-
7794, 1-7811, 56-58, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 132-33.
119. Id. at 1-7813, 65, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 134.
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He insisted that, because the owner does not want to grant
access, someone would have to assess the amount of compensa-
tion which would, therefore, require detailed regulation. 12 One
might add that such regulation would have to be continuing.
Moreover, the amount could be anywhere between the cost of
granting access (usually minimal) and the opportunity cost of
doing so-the income foregone by admitting a competitor. The
task would be difficult for a regulator, who would have better
information about the regulated market, and even more difficult
for a court or general competition authority.
AG Jacobs may be implying that a refusal to deal is not, in
itself, abusive, but may be abusive when coupled with another
abuse, such as tying or denying access to an adjacent market. 21
John Temple Lang has repeated this view.1 2 2
The judgment of the ECJ was shorter than the opinion of
AG Jacobs. The ECJ said that:
[E]ven if that case-law on the exercise of an intellectual property right
were applicable to the exercise of any property right whatever, it
would still be necessary, for the Magilljudgment to be effec-
tively relied upon in order to plead the existence of an abuse
within the meaning of Article [82] of the [Consolidated EC]
Treaty in a situation such as that which forms the subject-mat-
ter of the first question, not only that the refusal of the service
comprised in home delivery be likely to eliminate all competi-
tion in the daily newspaper market on the part of the person re-
questing the service and that such refusal be incapable of being
objectively justified, but also that the service in itself be indispen-
sable to carrying on that person's business, inasmuch as there
is no actual or potential substitute in existence for that home-
delivery scheme.' 2
3
The ECJ suggests that the cases on refusal to license may be dis-
tinguished from the earlier judgments on refusals to give access
to goods or services. It is widely thought that the holder of intel-
lectual property rights should have a wider discretion to deny
access. Otherwise, intellectual property rights would have no
value and would not induce investment in research and develop-
120. See id. at 1-7814-15, 69, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 135.
121. See id. at 1-7815, 73, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 136.
122. See Temple Lang, supra note 75, at 67.
123. Bronner, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7794, 1-7831, 41, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R.
112, 144-45 (emphasis added).
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ment.' 24 Whether or not intellectual property rights are in-
volved, it is not enough for the newcomer to show that access is
desirable; it must establish that it is necessary.1 25 The ECJ was
not required to state when access is required; it sufficed to indi-
cate that access was not required when there were other ways of
delivering newspapers 126 or when other publishers were capable
of creating a similar facility. 1 27 This implies that, where two un-
dertakings are able to compete in the neighboring market, there
may be no requirement to give access to a third. This is contrary
to the facts of the original judgment in Commercial Solvents,1 2
where both Istituto and Cyanamid Italiano, as well as Zoja, were
making and selling ethambutol, the product downstream.
In Bronner, the ECJ reverted to the old test that, to be abu-
sive, the refusal must exclude a particular firm (not everyone)
from the market downstream. 129 In my view, that was sensible.
If the newcomer had to show that no one but the dominant firm
had access, the dominant firm might provide access to someone
unlikely to compete aggressively and avoid enabling a vigorous
competitor to enter the market.
Neither AGJacobs nor the ECJ discussed whether Bronner's
newspaper was a new product. There were other Austrian news-
papers, but presumably they attracted different groups of read-
ers. The complainant failed on the ground that, because there
were other ways to deliver the paper, access was not necessary."'
Whether the product was sufficiently new did not have to be de-
cided in this case.
In several recent judgments, the CFI has required the Com-
mission to find that the business downstream could not be car-
124. Magill was only the second case to deal with information protected by copy-
right and the ECJ stressed that the circumstances were exceptional. Several authors
have notice how unusual this case was. See Temple Lang, supra note 75, at 65 n.28; see
also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE Li-
CENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4 (Apr. 6, 1995) ("Nor does such market power
impose on the intellectual property owner an obligation to license the use of their
property to others.").
125. Bronner, [1998] E.C.R. at 1-7831-32, 11 41, 45, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 144-45.
126. The application of the test to the facts was a matter for the national court that
had requested a reference. See id. at 1-7831, 43, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 145.
127. Id. at 1-7831, 44, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 145.
128. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Com-
mission, Joined Cases 6/73 & 7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309.
129. See Bronner, [1998] E.C.R. at 1-7831, 1 41, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 144-45.
130. See id. at 1-7831-32, 43-47, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 1.
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ried on without access to the facility.1 1 In Bronner, AG Jacobs
argued that where a facility has been created in conditions that
were not competitive, for instance, if it were paid for by the
State, it would be particularly difficult for a new entrant to dupli-
cate the facility.' 3 2 One might add that in a quasi-public situa-
tion, where the incumbent was protected by special or exclusive
rights and not subject to close competition, the need for an in-
centive to investment is less important. The many decisions of
the Commission requiring port authorities not to discriminate in
favor of their own sailings could have been based on their exclu-
sive franchise at the time the port was developed, but this is not
expressly mentioned. In the United Kingdom statutory under-
takings that are given exclusive rights to exploit a situation, such
as a water or gas resources, are normally required to supply eve-
ryone in the area on non-discriminatory terms.1 3 When nation-
alized undertakings are liberalized, a national regulator is often
established with power to control prices, and thereby relieving
the courts of a task to which they are ill suited.1 34
Since the judgment and opinion in Bronner, the whole atti-
tude toward refusal to grant access has become less intervention-
ist and establishing an abuse has become more difficult.
131. See, e.g., European Night Servs. (ENS) v. Commission, Joined Cases T-374,
375, 384 & 388/94, [1998] E.C.R. 11-3141, 11-3222-28, 205-21, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R. 718,
778-82; Tiercfi Ladbroke v. Commission, Case T-504/93, [1997] E.C.R. 11-923, [1997] 5
C.M.L.R. 309.
132. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bronner, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R.
1-7794, 1-7813-14, 66, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 134.
133. See Office of Water Servs. (U.K.), Water Act 2003 Water Supply Licensing:
Water Undertakers' New Conditions of Appointment, Licence Conditions for Water
Supply Licencees, Policy Proposals on Exceptions Regulations and Exemptions 19
(Dec. 21, 2004) (noting a duty to prevent undue preference or discrimination against
customers).
134. In certain situations, however, the Commission may still intervene. See Com-
mission Decision No. 2003/707/EC, O.J. L 263/9 (2003) (Deutsche Telekom). The
Commission imposed a fine on Deutsche Telekom for squeezing the margins of com-
petitors who wanted access to the local loop, even though its prices had been approved
by the national reguatory authority. The decision has been appealed in Deutsche Telekom
v. Commission, Case T-271/03, O.J. C 264/29 (2003). The Court of First Instance
("CFI") will have to decide whether compliance with regulation takes conduct outside
the competition rules. In the U.S. case, Verizon Commc'n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinco, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court recently raised the ques-
tion whether detailed regulation excludes antitrust scrutiny, so as to avoid conflicting
views.
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D. IMS
An interim decision of the Commission required IMS to li-
cense its copyright in what the Commission found was a de facto
industry standard, a set of maps on the basis of which IMS pro-
vided localized data about their distributors to its clients-the
pharmaceutical laboratories." IMS had obtained an interim in-
junction from a German court to restrain NDC and another
from infringing its copyright in the maps. The decision suggests
that where a de facto industry standard is protected by an intel-
lectual property right and prevents all competition in a neigh-
boring market, the holder is required to grant a license. Where
use of an industry standard is necessary for a newcomer to enter
a market and is protected by an intellectual property right, it
may be sensible to require a license even if there was no fraud in
establishing the standard, but this remains to be decided by the
courts. IMS appealed against the interim decisions and re-
quested interim relief. That case was withdrawn, however, when
a German court of appeals quashed the injunction on the
ground that IMS did not enjoy any copyright protection, but had
a right only to prevent slavish imitation.
Meanwhile, the German court of first instance, which had
granted the injunction, had asked the ECJ for a preliminary rul-
ing to ascertain whether IMS had infringed Article 82 by refus-
ing to license. Thus, the ECJ had to consider whether there was
a duty to grant access even if IMS enjoyed copyright protection.
The IMSjudgment 6 followed Magill closely and did not refer to
policy. The judgment did narrow the conditions in which access
might be compulsory, however, possibly as a result of AGJacobs'
opinion in Bronner. It stated that the conditions listed in para-
graph 54 of Magill were cumulative and exhaustive) 7 It added
there is an abuse only where:
. . . the undertaking which requested the licence does not
135. See Commission Decision No. 2001/165/EC, O.J. L 59/18 (2002) (IMS In-
terim Measures).
136. See IMS, Case C-418/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-5039, 48-50, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R.
1543, 1581; see also Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, IMS, Case C-418/01, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-5039, 61-63, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1543, 1565-67. The Advocate General merely
cites earlier judgments; the Court'sjudgment is even shorter.
137. See IMS, Case C-418/01, 38, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. at 1579 (citing Magill, Case
T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-485, and Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-743, 1-824, 54).
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intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or
service already offered on the secondary market by the owner
of the copyright but intends to produce new goods or services
not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is a
potential consumer demand. 138
This confirms the narrow view of paragraph 54 of Magill. For an
obligation to license to arise, the potential licensee must intend
to introduce a new product for which there is consumer demand
and which is not offered by the holder of the right-presumably,
case law will have to decide how different and superior the prod-
uct demanded is from products already supplied.
There is considerable controversy about the requirement
that the undertaking requiring access must intend to produce
something new.'3 9 Not only is the concept of novelty imprecise,
but "intention" is also a slippery word. Perhaps a minor change
to an existing product is not enough, but there must be a new
kind of product. 140 Moreover, novelty is not always desirable. In
Volvo, the ECJ had indicated circumstances that might be abu-
sive, such as refusing to license a repairer to make or import
spare parts coupled with a refusal to supply.'41 Spare parts that
must fit the design of a vehicle cannot be new because they
would not fit.
In Microsoft,1 42 a decision adopted shortly before the judg-
ment in IMS, the Commission relied on there being other possi-
ble exceptional circumstances. In cases dealing with an open ex-
138. IMS, Case C-418/01, 49, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. at 1581.
139. Compare Derek Ridyard, Compulsory Access Under EC Competition Law-A New
Doctrine of "Convenient Facilities" and the Case for Price Regulation, 11 EUR. COMPETITION L.
REv. 669 (2004) (fearing that even minor changes intended by the newcomer would
create a duty to give access), with Christian Ahlborn et al., The Logic & Limits of the
"Exceptional Circumstances Test" in Magill & IMS Health, 28 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1109,
1112 (2005) ("We say a product is 'new' for the purposes of the implementation of the
ECJ test if it satisfies a potential demand by meeting the needs of consumers in ways
that existing products fail to do. That is, a new product expands the market at current
prices by bringing in consumers whose demands were not previously satisfied.") (em-
phasis added).
140. John Temple Lang suggested that paragraph 54 in Magill related to a new
kind of product and not just a new product. See John Temple Lang, Address at the
University of Antwerp and LECG Conference (June 10, 2005). This distinction is not
easier to draw, but may move the goalposts toward products not being considered suffi-
ciently new.
141. See AB Volvo, Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 122.
142. See Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04 R, [2004] E.C.R. 11-2977,
55, [2005] 4 C.M.L.R. 406, 431.
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clusive license, the Commission never found that a product was
new, even if it was the best available, but this concept of novelty
was rejected by the ECJ in the Maize Seed case, 4 3 a case on the
meaning of an "open exclusive licence," where the Commission
had found that the improved varieties were not new.14 4
For the reasons that AG Jacobs presented in Oscar Bronner, I
hope that refusals to license rarely amount to an abuse. There
does not seem to be any good reasons to limit the doctrine to
cases where the newcomer wants to make a new product, al-
though the degree of novelty should be considered when mak-
ing an economic appraisal to establish benefits to consumers. In
my view, it is unfortunate that the ECJ attempted to define the
criteria of special circumstances in a short phrase.
In IMS, the ECJ, following constant case law, repeated that,
for the refusal of access to amount to an abuse, access must be
essential.' 45 Whether access was essential is a matter for the na-
tional court. 4 6 AG Tizzano went a little further and stated that,
if there were exceptional switching costs for the customers of the
firms wanting access, access would be necessary. 147 This could
depend on the extent to which the customers had helped IMS to
create a standard and IMS had adapted their organization to the
standard.
AG Tizzano said that access must not only be essential to the
complainant, but the refusal must eliminate all competition on
the secondary market, 148 a phrase used also in the judgment.149
Until the judgment in IMS was delivered, many judgments re-
ferred to eliminating all competition on the part of the person re-
questing the service or license. That is true in the early cases on
refusal to supply goods1 5 ' and also in Bronner."' In Magill, the
143. Nungesser (LG) KG v. Commission, Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015, 2068,
53, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278, 352.
144. Commission Decision 78/823/EEC, O.J. L 286/23 (1978) (Breeders' Righ
ts-Maize Seed).
145. See IMS, Case C-418/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-5039, 1 40-45, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R.
1543, 1579-80.
146. See id. at 1580.
147. See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, IMS, Case C-418/01, [2004] E.C.R.
1-5039, 11 84-86, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1543, 1570.
148. See id. at 1565-66, 61. In Magill, Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P,
[1995] E.C.R. 1-743, 1-824, 1 56, the ECJ referred to the dominant firms reserving the
secondary market for themselves, which amounts to the same thing.
149. See IMS, Case C-418/01, 1 52, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1543, 1581.
150. See Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp. v.
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ECJ referred to the dominant firm reserving the market to itself
or its subsidiary,15 2 but in Tgldmarketing, it referred to this phrase
as meaning eliminating all competition on the part of the person
requesting the service.153
If the opinion of AG Tizzano in IMS has settled the matter,
a duty to supply may be reduced by supplying an undertaking
that is not likely to act very aggressively. There is always a risk,
however, that, if the price for supply remains high or the ECJ
views access as only theoretical (to avoid a duty to supply), the
ECJ could refer back to other cases, such as Bronner.
The ECJ accepted that the duty to supply arises only if there
are two separate markets-one upstream and the other down-
stream. The ECJ followed AG Tizzano, 154 however, and added
that "it is sufficient that a potential market or even a hypotheti-
cal market can be identified"'155-a question for the national
court to answer. This view delights me-requiring only a poten-
tial or hypothetical market seems to me to be a polite way of
rejecting the doctrine that, for a duty to supply to arise, there
must be two markets where transactions are being concluded. It
does, however, enable the holder of the essential asset to exploit
the primary market.
No specific observations were made to the ECJ about
whether the refusal was justified. As in many earlier cases, how-
ever, the ECJ said that there is abuse if the refusal is notjustified
by objective considerations. 156
E. Syfait
In Syfait, 157 the Greek competition authority asked the ECJ
for a preliminary ruling. Greek wholesalers had complained
Commission, Joined Cases 6/73 & 7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223, 250-51, 7 25, [1974] 1
C.M.L.R. 309, 340-41.
151. Bronner, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112.
152. See Magill, Case C-241/91, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743, 1-824, 1 56, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R.
718, 791.
153. See Centre Belge d'Etudes du March&TClbmarketing SA (CBEM) v. Compa-
gnie Luxembourgeoise de T61diffusion, Case 311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261, 7 26-27,
[1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 558.
154. See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, IMS, Case C-418/01, 1 56-59,
[2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1543, 1564-65.
155. IMS, Case C-418/01, 1 44, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. at 1580.
156. See id. at 1582, 1 52.
157. Syfait, Case C-53/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-4609, [2005] 5 C.M.L.R. 7.
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that GlaxoSmithKline ("GSK") had ceased to meet in full their
orders for three medicines over which it held a dominant posi-
tion and that GSK had stated that it would supply hospitals and
pharmacies directly. 158 GSK alleged that parallel exports by the
wholesalers had led to significant shortages on the Greek mar-
ket. The questions from the Greek authority assumed that GSK
enjoyed a dominant position over the three medicines, and it
observed that all the Member States fix the prices or profits of
pharmaceutical products within their territories.1"9 Prices in
Greece were consistently the lowest in any Member State.16 °
Eventually, the ECJ declined jurisdiction on the ground that
the Greek authority was subject to ministerial influence and,
consequently, was not an independent court or tribunal entitled
to obtain a preliminary ruling. AG Jacobs had perceptively ana-
lyzed the case law and the economic context of the refusal to
supply, however, and his opinion will be influential in the future.
He accepted that, on occasion, a dominant firm may be under
an obligation to supply goods or services-for instance, when an
interruption would disrupt competition downstream between
the incumbent and its customer or, in a narrow range of circum-
stances, it may have to supply a third party for the first time to
avoid exceptional harm to competition. 16' AGJacobs noted the
difference between the earlier case law on refusals to supply
goods and the later decisions since Volvo.
Nevertheless, the ECJ had consistently limited the obliga-
tion to supply or license by reference to the possibility of objec-
tive justification. Consequently, AGJacobs insisted that a duty to
give access does not arise easily or automatically:162 "[A] domi-
nant pharmaceutical undertaking which restricts the supply of
its products does not necessarily abuse its dominant position
within the meaning of Art.82 EC merely because of its intention
thereby to limit parallel trade."'161
158. See id. 5-21, [2005] 5 C.M.L.R. at 35-38.
159. See id. at 37, 20.
160. See id.
161. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Syfait, Case C-53/03, 69, [2005] 5
C.M.L.R. 7, 24.
162. An opinion which he also expressed in Bronner. See Opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Jacobs, Bronner, Case 7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, 1-7813, 73, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R.
112, 134.
163. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Syfait, Case C-53/03, 69, [2005] 5
C.M.L.R. at 25.
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AG Jacobs concluded that an intention to limit parallel
trade might plausibly be one of the relevant circumstances,
which would ordinarily render a refusal to supply abusive.16 4
Nevertheless, such conduct was capable of objective justifica-
tion. 165 The facts of the case were extreme owing to the control
over prices and distribution exercised in differing ways by Mem-
ber States:
(a) National law imposed price differences-the common
market was not partitioned by the dominant firm, but by varying
kinds of control over price and distribution imposed by Member
States. 16 6
(b) If parallel imports were permitted, it would be impossi-
ble for the pharmaceutical companies to ensure adequate sup-
plies in each Member State because the whole common market
would be sourced from the country where the maximum price
was lowest. Moreover, the pharmaceutical companies were sub-
ject to regulation by national law that restrained suppliers from
withdrawing a drug once introduced. 167
(c) The national regulations were segregated. Thus, a duty
to supply any quantity demanded might lead to the medicines
not being supplied at all in the countries where the maximum
price was low, or at least to supply being delayed. 168
These arguments had been raised and dismissed by the ECJ
in the early cases on exhaustion under the Community policy of
free movement, but the Commission is now looking more to eco-
nomic arguments. AG Jacobs is well respected and his opinion
cogent. He restricted the application of his view strictly, which
may make it more acceptable.
AG Jacobs analyzed the economics of the innovative phar-
maceutical industry, with substantial investment in high fixed
costs, which were mostly sunk-of little use save for developing
the particular drug-and relatively low-variable costs. ' 69 This
164. See id. 70. This confirms the idea at which he hinted in his opinion in
Bronner that a refusal to supply is not an abuse unless accompanied by a further abuse,
such as tying, or reserving an adjacent market to oneself. See Opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Jacobs, Bronner, [1998] E.C.R. at 1-7813, 73, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 134.
165. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Syfait, 69, [2005] 5 C.M.L.R. at 25.
166. See id. at 26-28, 84.
167. See id. at 29, 1 86.
168. See id. at 29-30, 87, 91.
169. See id. at 30, 89-91.
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made it rational for the pharmaceutical companies to sell wher-
ever they could cover their variable cost. The mere fact that this
could be possible does not ensure that a producer could recover
its total costs if that price were generalized throughout the Com-
munity.170 This statement impliedly accepts that unilateral dis-
criminatory pricing does not necessarily infringe Article 82. This
theory is widely accepted by economists, most of whom advocate
"Ramsey pricing." 171
The regulatory negotiation of prices in the low-priced coun-
tries would be made more difficult, and there would be more
pressure for prices to be raised if they were to apply throughout
the common market.1 72 The revenue of the pharmaceutical
companies would be reduced and the incentive for research and
development would, to that extent, be reduced.173 If the phar-
maceutical companies were unable to raise prices in the low-
priced countries, they could withhold supplies or, at least, delay
their introduction.1 7 4
Usually, parallel trade leads to consumers in the low-priced
countries paying less, but that is not the case for medicines,
where the government normally bears the cost. In some Mem-
ber States, the government pays as much for medicines subject
to parallel trade as for those bought by wholesalers directly from
the producer at a higher price.175
AG Jacobs concluded, therefore, that for a pharmaceutical
producer to restrict supplies:
[T]o limit parallel trade is capable ofjustification as a reason-
able and proportional measure in defence of that undertak-
ing's commercial interests. Such a restriction does not pro-
tect price disparities which are of the undertaking's own mak-
170. See id. at 31, 1 94.
171. F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECoN. J. 47, 47-61
(1927). Provided that no price is below variable cost, no one is worse off if most of the
sunken overhead is recovered from those willing to pay more and most buyers are bet-
ter off. In the low-priced market, supplies will be available for those able and willing to
pay the variable cost, and this may even provide some contribution to the overhead,
which would benefit those who have to pay more. All economists generalize the theory
and argue that supply will be most efficient if the overhead is recovered from different
markets in inverse proportion to the elasticity of demand.
172. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Syfait, Case C-53/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-
4609, 92, [2005] 5 C.M.L.R. at 30-31.
173. See id. at 31, 93.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 31-32, 1 97-98.
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ing, not does it directly impede trade, which is rather blocked
by public service obligations imposed by the Member States.
To require the undertaking to supply all export orders placed
with it would in many cases impose a disproportionate bur-
den given the moral and legal obligations on it to maintain
supplies in all Member States. Given the specific economic
characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry, a requirement
to supply would not necessarily promote either free move-
ment or competition, and might harm the incentive for phar-
maceutical undertakings to innovate. Moreover, it cannot be
assumed that parallel trade would in fact benefit either the
ultimate consumers of pharmaceutical products or the Mem-
ber States, as primary purchasers of such products.176
The opinion is clearly limited to markets subject to specific con-
trols, such as those exercised by Member States over the pharma-
ceutical industry. National control over prices and distribution
distorts competition. The reasons for desiring Ramsey pricing in
this industry are also clearly set out. I hope that this Article will
encourage the institutions to follow AGJacobs-he has not fired
a broadside against the free movement of goods.
The opinion may be of wider importance. It is the first case
where the ECJ has considered whether what might ordinarily be
abusive can be justified. AG Jacobs has stated that the justifica-
tion in Syfait is reasonable and proportional. Hopefully, this will
be picked up generally and not only under Article 86(2).
The Greek competition authority probably should apply the
opinion of AG Jacobs, because it is the best available authority.
If this results in approving of GSK's policy of restricting supply,
the Greek dealers who pressed the competition authority to re-
quest a reference may well appeal the decision to a court, which
may well seek a preliminary ruling. Meanwhile, AG Jacobs has
retired from the ECJ and the term of many of the judges will
have expired. The judicial work will have to be redone, but,
doubtless, AG Jacobs's opinion will be studied and not wasted.
In two cases concerning rationing of medicines by compa-
nies dominant over the exploitation of patented pharmaceuti-
cals, decided before the opinion of AG Jacobs, the court of first
instance in Athens held that there was no abuse on much the
176. Id. at 32-33, 100.
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same grounds as AGJacobs advocated later. 177 I regret that the
Athenian court did not make an immediate reference.
CONCLUSION
If the opinion is followed, there are now four situations
when a duty for a dominant firm to supply may arise:
(a) when access is required by a former customer to prevent
a dominant firm extending its dominance to a neighboring mar-
ket and access is essential if the former customer is to carry on its
business (the early cases, from Commercial Solvents1 78  to
T9l6marketing179 and Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission).' 8
Either consumer harm within Article 82(b) or discrimination as
between equivalent transactions contrary to Article 82(c) would
have to be established;
(b) when access is required by an undertaking, not necessa-
rily a former customer, who intends to make a new product for
which there is actual or potential demand, provided that the in-
put is essential for producing such a product (Volvo,"' Magill,18 2
Bronner, 83 IMS).184 In this case, discrimination is unlikely and
consumer harm should be established under Article 82(b). It
may be that, where a patent or copyright protects the essential
facility, it will be more difficult to establish indispensability;' 8 5
177. See Polimeles Protodikio Athinon, Decisions 519/2003 & 609/2003. For a
description and comment see eCompetition Bulletin, http://concurrences.fr.
178. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Com-
mission, Joined Cases 6/73 & 7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223, 250-51, 25, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R.
309, 342.
179. Centre Beige d'Etudes du MarchC-T6lmarketing SA (CBEM) v. Compagnie
Luxembourgeoise de T6ldiffusion, Case 311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261, 3278, 26,
[1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 558, 573.
180. Tetra Pak Int'l SA v. Commission, Case C-333/94 P, [1996] E.C.R. 1-5951, 1-
6008, 27, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. 662, 721.
181. AB Volvo, Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, 6235, 1 8, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 122,
135.
182. Magill, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-834, 91.
183. Bronner, Case 7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791,1-7831, 1 41, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112,
144.
184. IMS, Case C-418/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-5039, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1543.
185. This clearly would not apply to trademarks. If it did, consumers would be
confused. It might apply to data protection and any other intellectual property right
designed to induce investment. See Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. at 6235, 8, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R.
at 135; see also Magill, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-834, 91; Bronner, [1998] E.C.R. at 1-7831, 41,
[1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 144.
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(c) when supply is limited with an intention to limit parallel
trade (Syfait); and
(d) when it can be plausibly argued that the obligation
arises where a legal or de facto industry standard is protected by
intellectual property rights. This seems to be the view of the
Commission in its decisions in IMS and Microsoft.186
These categories are probably not closed. According to
dicta in many judgments, the Commission's decisions in IMS
and Microsoft, and from the opinion in Syfait, it may also be ar-
gued that all four classes of refusal may be objectively justified in
the light of the specific circumstances of the industry, provided
that they are reasonable and proportional. The justifications
vary depending on the specific facts of the case.
A refusal to supply may also be abusive when used as retalia-
tion against competition when a restriction of that competition
would be illegal.
While at the ECJ, most recently as the senior Advocate Gen-
eral, Mr. Jacobs, now the right honourable Sir Francis Jacobs
KCMG, PC, earned a great reputation. He was a pragmatist and
often persuaded the ECJ to reconsider policy considerations ex-
pressly. He, himself, made a point of expressing them clearly
and in few words. They were not buried in the secrecy of the
deliberations of the judges, but remain publicly available to in-
fluence practitioners and the ECJ. His views tallied with the far
greater emphasis recently placed by the Commission and some-
times by the courts on protecting consumers and on economic
analysis rather than formalism. If the European economy be-
comes more flexible and vital as a result, our debt to his many
years at the ECJ is great.
We should not begrudge him his retirement. He will not
only be tending his garden. He is returning as professor to
King's College London and his availability to give speeches and
encourage debate there and elsewhere remains. Long may he
be active and continue to open up our prejudices to rational
argument! He is one of the great men of Europe.
186. I shall not consider the decision in Microsoft in this Article. Many of the issues
dealt with here arise in that controversial decision. An appeal to the CFI has been
lodged and a hearing started on April 24.
